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Enemies at the Gateway: Regional
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Against Oil Pipelines on Canada’s
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Robert Neubauer* and Shane Gunster
School of Communication, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada
This paper analyzes discursive storylines of opponents of Northern Gateway—a
proposed pipeline and tanker project designed to link Alberta oil sands producers
to international markets via Canada’s West Coast. It explores how regional concerns
about Northern Gateway helped galvanize a movement led by regional First Nations,
environmentalists, and settler communities, all of whom opposed Gateway as a means
to protect regional ecosystems—and the local communities dependent on them—from
“extra-regional” Gateway-backing elites. By articulating arguments against Northern
Gateway with salient collective action frames concerning ecological sustainability,
regional identity, Indigenous sovereignty, social justice, and democratic agency, this
anti-Gateway “discourse coalition” helped contribute to the project’s ultimate collapse
in 2016. In this paper, we critically engage with Ernesto Laclau’s theorization of Populism
to analyse this movement as a form of “regional ecological populism,” explaining
how a shift in spatial framing from the national to the regional enabled a particular
populist narrative to emerge. Furthermore, we relate Laclau’s framework to Martin Hajer’s
concept of discursive “storylines” and William Gamson’s analysis of “collective action
frames” to provide a grounded analysis of how coalitions articulate populist storylines
designed to mobilize diverse movement constituents. To do so we conduct a frame
analysis of communications materials produced by several prominent First Nations and
environmental organizations publicly mobilizing against Northern Gateway, tracing how
these groups articulated a common regional ecological populist storyline. Finally, we
end with some thoughts about the possibilities and challenges for scaling up regional
ecological populism in Canada.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, defenders of Canada’s oil and gas industry have turned to nationalist and
conservative populist storylines to frame development as a boon to Canadian workers and
taxpayers, while denigrating environmentalist opponents as foreign-backed elites (Neubauer,
2019). The apotheosis of this tactic came in 2012, when the Federal government of Prime Minister
Stephen Harper rushed to the defense of the controversial Northern Gateway pipeline and tanker
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project, a proposal designed to reach new export markets by
linking Alberta oil sands producers to the port of Kitimat,
British Columbia on Canada’s West Coast (2). Faced with
an anti-Gateway movement of regionally-based First Nations,
environmental groups, and local communities, the Harper
government denounced environmental groups testifying at
Gateway’s federal project review as “foreign funded radicals” and
liberal elites hijacking the review process and harming working
Canadian families (Oliver, 2012).
This dramatic episode helped galvanize a nascent movement
oriented around the protection of regional ecosystems—and
the communities dependent on them—from an alliance of
“extra-regional” Gateway-backing elites. Interestingly, this
movement reproduced key components of the inside-outside
national-populist “storyline” (Hajer, 1993, p. 47) pioneered by
industry defenders (Gunster and Saurette, 2014; Neubauer,
2019), albeit with a very different spatial framing (Gunster and
Neubauer, 2018). By articulating arguments against Northern
Gateway with salient collective action frames (Gamson,
1992, p. 7; Taylor, 2000, p. 511–517) concerning ecological
sustainability, regional identity, Indigenous sovereignty, social
justice, and democratic agency, this anti-Gateway “discourse
coalition” (Hajer, 1993, p. 45) sparked a powerful social
movement, ultimately contributing to the project’s collapse
in 2016.
To analyse the anti-Gateway movement, we engage with
Laclau’s (1977; 2007) theorization of Populism, relating his
framework to Hajer’s (1993, p. 43) concept of discursive
“storylines” and Gamson’s (1992, p. 7) work on “collective action
frames.” In doing so, we explore two core research questions.
First, how did a shift in spatial framing from the national to the
regional enable different interpretations of the project to emerge?
Second, how did opponents combine regional spatial frames with
collective action frames to articulate a regional ecological populist
storyline that encouraged diverse social actors to make common
cause against an externalized enemy?
We begin with an examination of the conditions which
enabled the emergence of this political movement. We follow
this with a frame analysis of communications materials
produced by several prominent First Nations and environmental
organizations mobilizing against Northern Gateway between
2010 and 2015. Finally, we conclude with some thoughts about
the possibilities and challenges for scaling up regional ecological
populism in Canada.
CANADIAN EXTRACTIVISM, POPULIST
ARTICULATION, AND NORTHERN
GATEWAY
Widely regarded as a seminal theorist of populism (Kaltwasser
and Taggart, 2017), Ernesto Laclau identifies the agonistic
dichotomy of “the people” vs. “the power-bloc” as the
foundation of populist politics. Such dichotomies have no
fixed, transhistorical meaning, but emerge through a process of
discursive articulation through which different actors come to
understand themselves as sharing a common enemy. According
to Laclau (2007), this “populist reason” rests upon three
interconnected elements:
1. The capacity of distinct social actors with unfulfilled social
demands—grievances which dominant social institutions
seem unable to address—to discursively link those demands
into “an equivalential chain” (p. 77). The lack of any “abstract
common feature underlying all social grievances” a priori
requires that the “equivalential chain. . . be expressed through
the cathexis of a singular element” (p. 96). This may involve
the articulation of a single overarching demand as a kind of
master/empty signifier which establishes the other demands
as equivalential to each other in the signifying chain.
2. The construction of a popular identity (i.e., “the people”) out
of heterogeneous aggrieved actors who make common cause
by reference to the “unfulfilled” nature of their particular
demands (p. 86). It is only if these actors “perceive that their
neighbours have other, equally unsatisfied demands” that an
“equivalential relation is established between them” (p. 73).
By allowing for “a set of particular identities or interests. . .
to regroup themselves as equivalential” to each other (p.
19), this process sponsors “the construction of a popular
identity” (p. 77).
3. The symbolic establishment “of an internal frontier dividing
society into two camps” (p. 77), distinguishing an aggrieved
people from those actors and institutions unwilling or unable
to satisfy their demands. For Laclau, this inability/refusal to
meet social demands is crucial in the construction of popular
identities, since the heterogeneity of social life means the
aggrieved actors have no a priori appeal to ontological unity.
It is only through their common “confrontation with” an
unresponsive “oligarchic power” that they come to experience
their interests as “analogous with each other” (p. 19). This
power generally includes actors positioned as economic,
political, or cultural elites, though it may also include those
framed as “outsiders” or “others.”
The history of conservative populism in Canada suggests
that Laclau’s “internal frontier” can be understood along both
socioeconomic and spatial-geographic lines. In recent decades
defenders of Canada’s fossil fuel industry have attacked their
opponents as elite ideologues exaggerating the environmental
costs of extractivist development to line their pockets and
fulfill their radical agenda, betraying workers and taxpayers
dependent on the industry (Gunster and Saurette, 2014,
Neubauer, 2019, p. 13–15). This discourse has often been
mapped onto the terrain of national identity. Industry and its
allies in government, civil society, and media have consistently
deployed “patterns of emphasis (on jobs and government
revenues) and omission (of corporate profits and low royalty
rates)” to perform “a kind of ‘symbolic nationalization’
of the industry” (Gunster and Saurette, 2014, p. 345). In
doing so, extractivist development becomes articulated “almost
exclusively as a kind of collective national enterprise to
serve the public good,” with its critics framed as outside
the nation.
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One particularly salient example was the Federal government’s
strident defense of Enbridge’s Northern Gateway project, a
proposal to link Alberta’s tar sands via pipeline to the port
of Kitimat on British Columbia’s North Coast, after which
it would be shipped to East Asian refineries via supertanker
(Neubauer, 2019, p. 6). By the time public hearings for
Gateway’s federal review were initiated in 2012, the proposal had
generated significant opposition from Indigenous organizations,
environmental groups, and local communities based in British
Columbia—the province through which much of the project
would be routed. Notably, project defenders responded by
framing the project as a vital “nation building” project (Barney,
2017) under attack by foreign funded enemies of Canada
(Neubauer, 2019, p. 13–15).
In an infamous public letter published in January 2012,
Natural Resources Minister Oliver (2012) explained how Canada
needed “to diversify our markets in order to create jobs
and economic growth for Canadians across this country” to
“ensure the financial security of Canadians and their families”
(emphasis added). Drawing on research by blogger Vivian Krause
highlighting the funding some Gateway opponents had received
from American foundations (Krause, 2012), the letter attacked
organizations testifying at the project’s review hearings as “foreign
funded radicals” (emphasis added). Paid by “foreign special
interest groups” and American “jet setting celebrities” to “hijack”
the nation’s regulatory apparatus, these groups were described
as pursuing “their radical agenda” no matter “the cost to
Canadian families in lost jobs and economic growth” (emphasis
added). This narrative was recirculated and endorsed in the
columns of conservative newspaper columnists, commentary of
conservative think tank scholars, and the blogs of industry-
supporting advocacy groups (Neubauer, 2019, p. 13–15). The
result was a powerful national populist storyline: Canadian
environmentalists opposed to new pipelines were not concerned
citizens with legitimate grievances, but radical elites, foreign
invaders, and enemies of the Canadian people.
ANTI-GATEWAY DISCOURSE COALITIONS
AND REGIONAL POPULIST STORYLINES
The contemporary structure of the industry necessitates this
type of “symbolic nationalization” if the sector is to retain
public support (Neubauer, 2019, p. 11–13). Since the oil sands’
neoliberal restructuring and expansion in the 1990s, high
corporate compensation rates, generous royalty and taxation
regimes, and low employment intensity have conspired to
establish an extraordinarily profitable industry that nevertheless
provides a relatively weak source of job creation, worker income,
and state revenue per dollar of investment (Pratt, 2007, p. 54;
Boychuk, 2010; Campanella, 2012; Fast, 2014, p. 36–53; Barney,
2017, p. 4, 7, 30–34).
Yet there is nothing about populism that necessitates
its articulation with a national space or conservative
worldview. Here, we analyse the anti-Gateway movement’s
collective action frames and narrative storylines as a means
to operationalize Laclau’s approach for the study of social
movement communications. We explore how the fight against
Northern Gateway led to the articulation of an ecological
populist storyline oriented around regional places and
identities, ecological sustainability, Indigenous sovereignty,
local democracy, and social justice. We also examine how place
mediated this storyline as a frame.
We believe an analysis of frames offers a grounded, granular
means of studying populist discourse that is broadly compatible
with Laclau’s overall approach. We believe this mode of
analysis builds on Laclau’s theorization of populist reason
as the discursive articulation of popular demands into an
equivalential chain. In particular, we connect the negative
dimension of populist reason highlighted by Laclau—in which
demands are symbolically linked through their shared refusal—
to an analysis of the affirmative discursive affinities (Hajer,
1993) between similar demands which also facilitate their
equivalential articulation.
Frames can be understood as the component pieces of larger
discourses—the various metaphors, imageries and cognitive
heuristics actors use to understand themselves and their relation
to the larger world (Taylor, 2000, p. 511–517). Different frames
allow subjects to come to different interpretations of the social
world by emphasizing particular aspects of phenomena while
downplaying others (Hajer, 1993, p. 45). By framing unwanted
social or ecological phenomena in particular ways, actors
give them “a specific meaning,” answering “politically essential
questions such as ‘Who is responsible?’ and ‘what should be
done?”’ (Hajer, 1993, p. 44).
It should be noted that some strands of frame analysis
(Lakoff, 2010) have been criticized (Brulle, 2010) for—among
other things—positing a static conception of discourse which sees
frames as relatively fixed or pregiven. This poses difficulties for
studying the emergent and contingent nature of social movement
discourse, problematizing any operationalization of Laclau’s
poststructural approach to analyzing populism. However, we
draw on approaches to framing—extensively developed by Taylor
(2000), Hajer (1993), and Gunster and Neubauer (2018)—
that see social movement frames as fundamentally contingent
and contested. In this approach, the meanings of different
frameworks emerge from the discursive activity of concrete
movement actors and the evolving political, historical, and
cultural context within which discourse takes shape.
According to Hajer, for instance, the framing of political
conflict is both conducted by and constitutive of “discourse
coalitions,” decentralized yet allied groups of actors aligned
around a common discourse (Hajer, 1993, p. 45). Hajer defines
discourse as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and
categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed
in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is
given to physical and social realities” (1993, p. 44). Together,
coalition actors work to articulate separate yet discursively
affinitive frames into an overarching storyline around which they
can organize politically, providing a framework for collective
action by articulating plausible causes of and potential solutions
to a given problem (p. 47).
When coalitions are shut out from policy-making institutions,
coalition actors must mobilize broad-based social movements
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that can generate the necessary political capital to impose their
storyline on the policy field. To achieve this, organizers may seek
to “reframe” different phenomena to increase the resonance of
their storylines with potential movement participants (Taylor,
2000, p. 511–517). As Dorceta Taylor notes, this often involves
frame “bridging,” or the symbolic grafting of “two ideologically
compatible but structurally separate frames that refer to the same
issue” (p. 512). We argue that by bridging arguments against
Northern Gateway with a regional spatial frame—rather than the
national one favored by industry proponents—the anti-Gateway
coalition generated contrasting interpretations of the project’s
distribution of costs and benefits, the equity of that distribution,
and corresponding accounts of the “people” and the “elites.”
This spatial bridging was articulated with the anti-Gateway
coalition’s “collective action frames,” which Snow and Benford
(in Gamson, 1992) describe as “action oriented sets of beliefs
and meanings that inspire and legitimate social movement
actions and campaigns” (p. 7). Gamson (1992, p. 7) notes that
social movement actors seek to mobilize constituents through
their deployment of collective action frames related to injustice,
agency, and identity. Injustice frames are critical in establishing
any antagonistic politics, as they assign blame for social ills to
“motivated human actors” responsible for “harm or suffering”
(Gamson, 1992, p. 7). Identity framesmotivate political responses
to these injustices by nominating collective actors seen as most
aggrieved by them, positioning a collective “we” against an
offending “they.”Agency frames provide “some sense of collective
efficacy,” implying the aforementioned “we” can alter “conditions
or policies through collective action.”
Articulated together, these frames enable actors to constitute
collective identities, identify injustices committed against those
identities, and amplify perceptions of agency on the part of
movement actors in overcoming these injustices (Gamson,
1992, p. 7). Correspondingly, the anti-Gateway discourse
coalition leveraged opponents’ connections to local place to
articulate a regional populist storyline in which representatives
of various regional identities (British Columbians, First Nations,
environmentalists, etc.) exercised their democratic agency by
opposing injustices imposed by Gateway-supporting elites from
outside the region. In many respects, this process was analogous
to Laclau’s description of populist reason, in which the
articulation of an equivalential chain of unfulfilled demands
enables the establishment of an internal frontier between
aggrieved “popular” actors and the elites which refuse to meet
their demands.
The movement identities constructed by anti-pipeline
movements in Canada have emerged from political alliances
between First Nations and various settler activists and
communities. Within the context of ongoing regimes of
settler colonial governance and territorial dispossession, such
alliances are rather politically contingent. Yet this contingency
resonates with Laclau’s (2007) approach to populist reason, in
which coalitions of heterogeneous actors come to see themselves
“as analogous with each other” not through any a priori ontic
unity, but through their mutual “confrontation with oligarchic
power” (p. 19). This perception of shared political identity
occurs as a particular demand emerges as an empty signifier
through which other demands become equivalential; the broader
the coalition, the emptier the signifier necessary to anchor
the equivalential chain (p. 97). We argue that the rejection of
Gateway became just such a signifier, standing in for various
demands appealing to different actors within the movement.
In his recent work Laclau (2007) envisions popular identities
as emerging from a mutually recognized lack or absence,
namely, the inability of the oligarchy to meet different actors’
demands. While this logic partially explains the coherence of
the anti-Gateway coalition, an analysis of coalition storylines—
and the frames constituting them—reveals the importance of
more affirmative aspects in knitting together diverse actors into
a shared popular identity. As Hajer (1993) notes, discourse
coalitions create storylines out of separate discursive strands
by leveraging their “discursive affinities”: the “similar way[s]”
unique frames have of “conceptualizing the world” (p. 47).
In the case of Gateway, such affinities were grounded in
the interdependencies between people and place. The anti-
Gateway coalition invoked these affinities to build a populist
storyline in which oligarchic actors from outside the region
posed an existential threat to the local space/places that different
regional actors depended upon for their livelihoods, identity,
and community.
In our study, the focus on place helps ground the equivalential
chains of populist reason in a particular materiality; namely,
collective interdependencies with specific places. The places in
which we live—and the ecologies which underpin them—are
not merely discursive frames, but also the material basis for our
economic systems of production, political jurisdictions, physical
dwellings, built communities, and sociocultural identities. The
mediation of populist storylines by different spatial frames
thereby enables different interpretations of the world and our
relation to it which, while discursively constructed, are grounded
in amateriality as solid as the earth beneath our feet. In the case of
Gateway, understanding the material interdependencies between
different actors and particular places is crucial to understanding
how these actors came to see their demands as equivalential to
each other.
Local Place-Based Identity and Ecological
Risk
By mediating claims about the Gateway project via a national
space, the national popular storyline of pipeline proponents
symbolically sutured the interests of oil sands firms and
investors to the “average Canadian worker” or “taxpayer”
(Neubauer, 2019, p. 11–13). Yet when it comes to tar sands
extraction and transportation, the most salient spatial frames
are often local. Accordingly, Gateway’s opponents emphasized
movement frames which articulated the project as a threat to
regional identities.
The carbon-intensive nature of the oil sands development
(Nikiforuk, 2010, p. 127–145) has drawn the ire of the global
climate movement (Davidson and Gismondi, 2011, p. 111–141).
Yet this development also generates severe local risks, as the
extraction, transportation, and refining of bitumen—a toxic,
sludge-like substance—has traditionally produced significant air,
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water and land pollution (Nikiforuk, 2010, p. 60–111; Davidson
and Gismondi, 2011, p. 111–141). Local ecological and health
impacts have often been disastrous, especially in communities
located downstream from extraction sites or tailing ponds
(Nikiforuk, 2010, p. 60–111; Davidson and Gismondi, 2011, p.
111–141; Preston, 2013, p. 43–47).
In the case of Northern Gateway these local impacts were
particularly worrisome, and many regional actors recoiled at
the devastating ecological, economic, and health effects of a
potential pipeline leak or tanker spill (Hoberg, 2013, p. 380–
382). Pipeline leaks were a serious concern for a project proposed
to cross over a thousand rivers and streams, including some
of the world’s most productive remaining salmon habitats
(Stendie, 2013, p. 2). Gateway also would have brought as
many as 300 supertankers a year through the remote port
of Kitimat (Nikiforuk, 2010, p. 123)—an unprecedented level
of traffic on BC’s difficult to navigate North Coast—while
passing through rich marine ecosystems (Panofsky, 2011). In
return for accepting these risks, the province would gain a
relatively small number of short-term construction jobs and
a handful of permanent positions in pipeline maintenance.
And because Canadian provinces cannot claim royalties on
resources transported through their jurisdiction, BC would gain
few long-term tax revenues. All of this primed regional identities
of local actors and communities dependent on healthy local
ecosystems for both their cultural identities and much of their
economic activity, whether the province’s large-scale fisheries or
its booming ecotourism sector (Lee, 2012).
The relationship between local place, ecological risk, and
identity was especially salient for many First Nation communities
located along the project route. The pipeline “would [have
crossed] the traditional territories of at least 60 different First
Nation communities, and would potentially impact the lands of
many others, the vast majority of whom [had] not completed
a modern land claims agreement” (Panofsky, 2011, p. 22–23).
As Davidson and Gismondi note (Davidson and Gismondi,
2011), Indigenous communities located near resource extraction
projects often face unique environmental and health risks, as
they are often heavily reliant “on the services provided by their
local watershed for food and livelihood provision” (p. 183).
Just as importantly, relationships to traditional territories are
constitutive of the modes of social organization and cultural
identities of many First Nation communities, and are intimately
connected to contemporary anti-colonial struggles. As political
scientist Coulthard (2014) explains:
Indigenous anticolonialism, including Indigenous anticapitalism,
is best understood as a struggle primarily inspired by and
oriented around the question of land—a struggle not only for
land in the material sense, but also deeply informed by what
the land as system of reciprocal relations and obligations can
teach us about living our lives in relation to one another and the
natural world in non-dominating and non-exploitative terms. . .
I call this place-based foundation of Indigenous decolonial
thought and practice grounded normativity, by which I mean
the modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices and
longstanding experiential knowledge that inform and structure
our ethical engagements with the world and our relationships
with human and non-human others over time (p. 13).
Regional Injustice and Ecological Populism
The risk to local places threatened regional identities predicated
on their economic, cultural, and political interdependence
with those same places, increasing their salience relative to
the national identities primed by Gateway’s proponents. This
allowed a broad-based regional discourse coalition of Indigenous
organizations, settler Canadian communities, and environmental
groups to articulate diverse regional identity frames within a
common storyline. More than the simple presence of local risks,
it was their unjust distribution that motivated these actors. While
proponents claimed that Northern Gateway would produce
significant economic benefits for BC, opponents countered that
most immediate economic gains would accrue to Enbridge
and project investors (Lee, 2012, p. 10–15; Neubauer, 2019).
Similarly, the expanded upstream bitumen production Gateway
was designed to facilitate would primarily generate long-term
benefits for Albertan and international companies active in the
oil sands and the banks which financed them. And the increased
provincial tax revenue generated by the project would mostly
accrue to Alberta.
A second set of injustices were related to the perceived
democratic unaccountability of the federal government and its
environmental review process. Much of this stemmed from
widespread public perception of industry capture. In the years
following their initial election victory in 2006, many critics had
come to see the Conservative government as a puppet of Alberta’s
oil industry, given their ties to industry lobbyists; budget cuts
to ecological research; legislative inaction on climate change;
gag orders on government climate and environmental scientists;
and the use of public monies for expensive pro-oil sands public
relations campaigns (Cayley-Daoust andGirard, 2012; Nikiforuk,
2013; Turner, 2013, p. 136–189; Gutstein, 2014).
Regional critics had similar concerns about the project review
process. Traditionally, federal legislation mandated that major
energy project proposals receive approval from two regulatory
bodies—the National Energy Board (NEB) and the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) (Van Hinte et al.,
2007, p. 127). Yet in 2009 the federal government authorized
the NEB to carry out a single “Joint Review Panel” (JRP) for
the project, with community hearings to be held throughout
Alberta and BC starting in January 2012 (Gunster and Neubauer,
2018, p. 717). As the NEB was industry-funded and largely
staffed by corporate insiders, environmentalists doubted its
ability to conduct an impartial review. These fears seemed
legitimated by the announcement that the JRP would largely
exclude upstream and downstream climate change impacts
from its consideration. Local actors were also angry at the
panel’s lack of regional representation, as well as “an agreement
between the Federal and B.C. governments in which the latter
waived its right to conduct an independent provincial project
assessment” (p. 717–718).
Concerns about procedural fairness were turbocharged in
January 2012, when the federal government publicly attacked
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environmental organizations participating in the JRP of being
“foreign funded radicals,” using funding from US charitable
foundations to “hijack” the review process and sabotage
Canadian working families (Oliver, 2012). This national
populist storyline was explicitly used by the Conservatives
to publicly legitimize two new pieces of federal legislation—
C-38 and C-45—which critics alleged were designed to gut
Canada’s environmental regulation and project assessment
regime (Hoberg, 2013, p. 375; Nikiforuk, 2013; Coulthard,
2014, p. 151–180). Together the two bills removed a host
of environmental safeguards for various aquatic and land
based ecosystems; steeply curtailed public involvement in future
reviews; and shifted authority for final project approval from the
NEB to the Gateway-supporting cabinet, rendering widespread
public involvement in the review process legally irrelevant
(Neubauer, 2019, p. 14).
These injustice frames were particularly relevant for Northern
Gateway’s Indigenous opponents. The grounded normativity
described by Coulthard, in which modes of social organization of
numerous Indigenous peoples are informed by deep reciprocal
relations with their traditional territories, gains political salience
in the context of a national colonial project and resource
economy both dependent on the continuous appropriation,
governance, and exploitation of those territories (Coulthard,
2014, p. 1–24, 51–78). As such, Corntassel and Bryce (2011)
argue, “[b]eing Indigenous today means engaging in a struggle
to reclaim and regenerate one’s relational, place-based existence”
(p. 152). Yet unlike in most of Canada, where “treaties were
signed in which Aboriginal people ‘ceded and surrendered’ their
traditional territories,” most of British Columbia was seized
without the signing of nation-to-nation treaties (Panofsky, 2011,
p. 98). As a result courts have awarded many BC First Nations
heightened legal standing concerning rights and title, with rulings
affirming that Indigenous communities’ precolonial territorial
sovereignty remains unextinguished in large swaths of the
province (Coulthard, 2014, p. 1–24).
As such, explains Hoberg (2013), various First Nations
opposed Gateway both due to the potential “impact of spills on
culturally and economically important resources” and as a means
“to force attention to their broader demands for rights and title”
(p. 376). The proposed route ran through large swaths of unceded
territory, and the JRP had no jurisdiction to make decisions
regarding Indigenous title (Panofsky, 2011, p. 28). Furthermore,
many Indigenous opponents accused the JRP process of violating
their rights under section 35 of the Constitution, whichmandates
that First Nation communities be appropriately consulted and
accommodated concerning development projects which may
affect their Aboriginal or treaty rights. In their view, negotiations
over Gateway should have proceeded on a nation to nation
basis between Ottawa and affected Nations, instead of Indigenous
communities participating in the JRP as merely another interest
group (p. 77). Some communities refused to participate in the
JRP process entirely, while others that did engage nevertheless
condemned it as illegitimate.
These concerns were amplified by the federal government’s
passage of Bill C-45 in 2012. By facilitating the leasing out
of reserve lands with minimal community input, weakening
environmental regulations, and narrowing the scope of projects
requiring federal reviews, the legislation was widely perceived as
a stealth attack on Indigenous rights and title and the capacity
of First Nations to enforce environmental safeguards on their
own lands (Coulthard, 2014, p. 151–180). This perceived injustice
became a decisive factor in launching the 2012 “Idle No More”
movement, a Canada-wide series of protests against the colonial
state which made the repeal of C-45 one of its central demands.
According to Laclau (2007, p. 65–172), popular identities
emerge through the establishment of an equivalential chain of
demands, uniting heterogeneous social actors against the forces
perceived as responsible for their disparate grievances. This
“equivalential chain” is often “expressed through the cathexis of
a singular element,” precisely because the radical heterogeneity of
social life means that populist discourse cannot simply discover
“an abstract common feature underlying all social grievances”
(96). Rather, it occurs via “a performative operation constituting
the [equivalential] chain as such.”
The Gateway project and its perceived injustices provided
just such a “singular element,” through which actors could
articulate a chain of equivalential demands related to Indigenous
sovereignty; protection of coastal ecosystems, economies and
cultures; climate change; industry capture of the state apparatus;
and regional democratic accountability. Such common cause
did not emerge out of an a priori unified regional identity—
an unlikely development given long-standing tensions between
settler and Indigenous communities generated by the Canadian
colonial project. Rather, a shared identity emerged out of a
regional ecological populist storyline emphasizing diverse regional
actors’ shared dependence upon the ecological integrity of local
places. Local spaces and places came to embody the “privileged
signifiers. . . which condense in themselves the signification of a
whole antagonistic camp” (Laclau, 2007, p. 86).
If identities, cultures and economies dependent on the
integrity of regional ecologies enabled the construction of a
regional popular discourse, how did movement actors come to
articulate an “internal frontier” dividing themselves from their
enemies? Through the construction of a shared storyline in
which regional popular forces were engaged in a democratic
struggle against a cabal of hostile extra-regional elites—Albertan
and international oil companies; the Albertan and federal
governments; Chinese investors; international finance capital;
Bay Street banks and investment firms, etc.—imposing Gateway
on the region. Interestingly, this inside-outside narrative
replicated the populist foreign invader storyline deployed by
project supporters. Yet the mediation of this narrative through
a regional-local rather than national spatial frame enabled the
populist storyline to be recast with a different set of actors in the
roles of hero and villain.
Regional Agency and Ecological Popular
Successful framing strategies for grassroots movements must
leverage political opportunities that enhance movement
participation and growth (Gamson, 1992, p. 6: Taylor, 2000,
p. 520). As Taylor (2000) explains, “Activists have to be
keenly aware of what resources. . . are available to them
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and how to use these resources to initiate and maintain
movement activities” (p. 519).
How did the anti-Gateway coalition bring together different
yet complementary resources, while taking advantage of political
opportunities? Regional environmental groups such as Sierra
Club BC and Dogwood Initiative, for instance, had significant
financial resources, numerous supporters, and connections to
large multinational ENGOs. First Nations organizations such as
the Union of BC Indian Chiefs, the Yinka Dene Alliance, and
Coastal First Nations had access to an energized movement of
activists, many of whom had mobilized in the Idle No More
movement in 2012.
Indigenous communities also possessed legal claims to
territorial sovereignty on unceded territory. “In March 2010,”
explains Hoberg, “the Coastal First Nations, an alliance of
First Nations on BC’s North and Central coasts”—including
Wuikinuxv, Heiltsuk, Kitasoo/Xaixais, Nuxalk, Gitga’at,
Metlakatla, Old Massett, Skidegate, and Council of the Haida
Nation—issued a declaration “‘that oil tankers carrying crude
oil from the Alberta Tar Sands will not be allowed to transit our
lands and waters”’ (p. 381). In December of that same year, “the
Yinka Dene Alliance, a coalition of six First Nations in the Fraser
River watershed”—including the Nadleh Whut’en, Nak’azdli,
Takla Lake, Saik’uz, Wet’suwet’en, and Tl’azt’en—issued the Save
the Fraser Declaration, which was later signed by more than 60
other First Nations.” The Declaration’s rejection of Northern
Gateway was unequivocal:
“in upholding our ancestral laws, Title, Rights and responsibilities,
we declare: We will not allow the proposed Enbridge Northern
Gateway Pipelines, or similar Tar Sands projects, to cross our
lands, territories and watersheds, or the ocean migration routes
of Fraser River Salmon” (cited in Panofsky, 2011, p. 23).
If the federal regulatory apparatus was widely perceived as
insulated from regional democratic pressures, how did the
anti-Gateway coalition cultivate a sense of efficacy in potential
movement constituents? They framed participation in public
consultation less as a means of influencing a regulatory decision,
and more as a strategic means of undermining the symbolic
legitimacy of the regulator to approve the project.
Anti-Gateway organizations and activists seized upon
numerous opportunities to influence the state. These activities
served a parallel function of framing project opponents as
the legitimate representatives of regional democratic publics,
explicitly contrasted with the unaccountable Joint Review Panel
(JRP) process. Environmental groups mobilized supporters to
sign up to the hearings in unprecedented numbers, forcing the
panel to extend hearings by over a year and ensuring that the
vast majority of public testimony opposed project approval
(Neubauer, 2019, p. 7). In doing so, they simultaneously
demonstrated the lack of regional support for Gateway while
pre-emptively delegitimizing the JRP’s eventual approval of
the project.
Opponents held well-attended demonstrations, organized
community information sessions, circulated petitions, and
commissioned regional polls demonstrating majority opposition
to increased tanker traffic (Hoberg, 2013, p. 380–382). They
also organized extensive provincial and federal electoral outreach
campaigns, recognizing that widespread regional opposition to
Gateway provided opposition parties with a valuable wedge
issue against the more extractivist-oriented governing parties
(Neubauer, 2017). Perhaps the most notable example was an
April 2014 municipal referendum held in Kitimat, BC, the
terminus of the proposed pipeline (Gunster and Neubauer, 2018,
p. 721). In a remarkable feat of grassroots organizing, opponents
ultimately persuaded 58% of Kitimat voters to reject the project,
“despite Enbridge’s significant advertising and public relations
expenditures in the small port town” (Gunster and Neubauer,
2018, p. 721).
Regional ENGOs and Indigenous organizations also
created multiple opportunities for collaboration in ways which
legitimated their claims to regional popular representativeness
while undermining the symbolic authority of the JRP and
project proponents. Dogwood and Sierra often publicized the
activities of both CFN and YDA, regularly releasing blog posts
and press releases documenting new signatories to the Save the
Fraser Declaration (Neubauer, 2017). Representatives of both
organizations signed the Fraser Declaration Solidarity Accord,
a petition issued by YDA leadership as a means to publicize
Indigenous opponents’ broad public support.
Finally, several Indigenous communities launched legal
challenges to the JRP’s conditional approval of the project in
2013 on the grounds that the panel had not sufficiently consulted
affected communities (West Coast Environmental Law, 2015).
By bringing communities into the consultation process well after
the panel’s scoping phase, they argued the federal government
had offered them a superficial level of input that did not meet
its constitutionally mandated duty to consult and accommodate.
Notably, in 2014 multiple ENGOs co-launched the Pull Together
campaign, a program that raised “funds for First Nations legally
challenging Enbridge’s proposed Northern Gateway pipeline”
(History, n.d.).
THE ANTI-GATEWAY MOVEMENT AND
REGIONAL ECOLOGICAL POPULIST
DISCOURSE
In the remainder of this paper, we explore how Gateway’s
opponents articulated arguments against the project with a
regional spatial frame to establish a regional ecological populist
storyline. We conduct a frame analysis of communication
materials produced by four prominent organizations
campaigning against the pipeline between 2011 and 2015.
Two prominent First Nations organizations—CFN and the
YDA—and ENGO’s—Sierra Club BC (SCBC) and Dogwood
Initiative (DI)—opposing Gateway were selected for analysis. A
sample of 245 texts produced by these organizations between
2011 and 2015 was collected from organization websites and the
Canadian Newsstream database. These included blog posts, press
releases, issue backgrounders, op-eds, and research reports (see
Table 1). Materials were analyzed with NVIVO 11, a qualitative
analysis software suite.
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TABLE 1 | Communications materials produced by sample organizations
between 2011 and 2015.
Backgrounder Blog Post Op-eds Press
Release
Reports Total
CFN 2 9 0 13 1 25
Dogwood 3 101 2 31 0 137
Sierra
Club BC
13 30 5 17 0 65
YDA 0 0 1 17 0 18
Total 18 140 8 78 1 245
A frame analysis was conducted, with a focus on using
Gamson’s (1992) collective action frames to operationalize
Laclau’s theory of populist reason. Laclau’s emphasis on the
discursive constitution of popular identities led us to analyse
which particular collective identities—including regional,
Indigenous, Canadian, and socioeconomic—were framed as
protagonists in opponent storylines, noting when different
actors were described as allied in opposition to the project.
Various injustice frames were identified as a means to examine
the articulation of popular demands within an equivalential
chain. These included under attack; unfair distribution
of risk and benefit; violation of sovereignty; government
corruption/industry capture; and imposition of environmental
or economic risk frames. We also noted which actors were
framed as elite enemies responsible for the offending injustices,
which—when positioned against the collective identity frames—
allowed us to trace the establishment of an “internal frontier”
separating “popular forces” from the “power bloc.” Agency
frames were included to better understand how opponents
mobilized constituents by championing their ability to defeat
these elite enemies. Finally, we took note of how popular
identities, injustices, and elite enemies were framed spatially;
i.e., whether they were bridged with regional, local, national, or
global spatial frames.
These frames were generated from multiple sources. Some
were identified from a literature review of previous studies of
environmental communications and energy politics (Gunster
and Saurette, 2014; Neubauer, 2019); Indigenous reconciliation
and decolonial politics (Coulthard, 2014); political ecology of
the Canadian oil sands and contemporary pipeline projects,
and related environmental and economic risks (Nikiforuk,
2010; Davidson and Gismondi, 2011; Lee, 2012; Fast, 2014);
and populist politics (Hall, 1988; Laclau, 2007; Frank, 2012).
Further frames were identified through a preliminary scoping
of a small subsample of the collected communication materials.
Finally, frames were added on an emergent basis throughout the
coding process.
In what follows we draw on our findings to explore
how these groups leveraged these frames to symbolically
construct a “regional popular” movement identity composed of
First Nations, regional communities, British Columbians, and
environmental activists exercising political agency to address
injustices imposed by extra-regional Gateway-supporting elites.
In doing so, we foreground the role of regional spatial frames in
mediating the articulation of what we call a regional ecological
populist storyline.
Articulating Local Ecological Risk With
Regional Identities
In their communications materials, opponents constructed
movement identities around a chain of equivalential demands,
many of which concerned the economic and ecological risks
associated with a pipeline leak or tanker spill. As Laclau’s
framework suggests, such demands could be treated as
equivalential due to their mutually unmet nature. However,
there were also discursive affinities linking these demands in a
more affirmative fashion: their common reference to threatened
regional ecosystems and the diverse communities which
depended on them. These threatened local ecosystems were
explicitly framed as the basis for the well-being of local residents,
establishing the rationale for shared movement identities.
Notably, all four organizations consistently prioritized local
risks from a bitumen spill as compared to broader global risks
like climate change, while highlighting the common interests of
different regional actors vulnerable to those risks. CFN frequently
argued that Northern Gateway generated unacceptable economic
risks, linking unique regional ecosystems with local economies
and identities. In an August 2012 press release (CFN, 2012,
August 2), the organization decried the threats increased tanker
traffic posed to the Great Bear Rainforest, a federally protected
conservation area home to Indigenous and settler communities
dependent on healthy marine ecosystems, whether for daily
substance or long-term employment:
The Great Bear is. . . one of the only places on our planet where
intact coastal temperate rainforest, large wild rivers, and healthy
cold-water seas come together. . . .The forests, rivers, and seas
represent daily food and a way of life for coastal communities and
First Nations. The immense natural capital of this region sustains
a diverse economy representing tens of thousands of long-term
Canadian jobs, valued at billions of dollars annually.
CFN president Art Sterritt made similar arguments in a
March 2012 report documenting the potential impact of
increased tanker traffic on BC’s North Coast. Sterritt claimed
that “All the work we are doing to create a sustainable
economy would be wiped out by an oil spill,” which “would
devastate fishing, tourism, and traditional subsistence
harvesting, which are the backbones of the economy in
the North and Central Coast and Haida Gwaii” (CFN,
2012, March).
The ENGOs made similar claims. One January 2012 SCBC
post referred to a recent report “published by the Natural
Resources Defense Council, the Pembina Institute and Living
Oceans Society” (Sierra Club BC, 2012, January 23). Sierra
explained how:
The report details the dangers of bitumen transportation and the
risks of spills to the environment and the economy in a region
that depends on healthy fisheries, lands, and waters. At risk from
an oil spill would be the approximately $250 million annually
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from commercial fishing, $550 million annually from recreational
fishing, and hundreds of millions from nature tourism.
The Internal Frontier of the Regional
Popular: Project Backers as
Extra-Regional Elites
The articulation of an equivalential chain of demands was
facilitated not just by the existence of shared risks, but
recognition of their unfair distribution. Opponents’ injustice
frames explicitly attacked project-supporters as a cabal of
powerful elites willing to impose harm on regional actors in
the name of profit. The refusal of these elites to meet popular
demands of different regional actors—for ecosystem protection,
the safeguarding of local economies and industries, respect for
regional autonomy, Indigenous sovereignty etc.—became the
basis of a movement identity rooted in those actors’ collective
confrontation with a common oligarchic power. However,
demands were also linked through their mutual reference to
the importance of local places and the different actors that
depended on or had claim to them in specific ways. As such, the
bridging of these demands with regional spatial frames allowed
opponents to establish an internal frontier dividing legitimate
regional popular forces from “foreign” elites invading the region
from the outside.
Dogwood especially favored this narrative, often contrasting
the elite aggressors with the democratic agency of regional
publics whose members were collectively dependent on healthy
local ecosystems. In one online backgrounder, the group
explained how:
Some of themost powerful oil companies in the world are pushing
to bring more and more crude oil tankers to B.C.’s coast. They
would jeopardize the livelihoods of tens of thousands of British
Columbians and the stability of the Great Bear Rainforest and
southern Gulf Islands ecosystems in the name of profit. We can
hold them back and keep our oceans and rivers healthy and
livelihoods secure, but it’s going to take size and diversity. That’s
where you come in (Dogwood Initiative, n.d.).
CFN similarly decried the inequitable distribution of risk and
benefit, highlighting potential harms absorbed by Indigenous
and settler actors. In a June 2012 press release (CFN, 2012,
June 20) responding to the “third Alberta oil pipeline spill
in [a single] month,” CFN president Art Sterritt argued that
“Enbridge’s proposed Northern Gateway is a dangerous, short-
sighted project that would make oil companies rich and leaves
in its wake oil spills, environmental destruction and long-term
economic damage to local communities.” A March 2012 report
issued by CFN outlining the risks from a tanker or pipeline spill
made similar claims:
The Enbridge Gateway project imposes an unnecessary and high
risk to Coastal First Nations and other British Columbians.
Despite the safety measures proposed by Enbridge, there is a high
likelihood of a major oil spill and the impact of a spill would be
devastating to the environment and the economy. . . . Enbridge
expects Coastal First Nations and British Columbians to take all
the risks of the project while almost all the benefits accrue to the
oil and gas industry and Alberta (CFN, 2012, March).
The illegitimacy of extra-regional elites was often overtly
contrasted with the popular legitimacy of opponents,
who were described as broadly representative of the
region’s Indigenous peoples, settler communities, local
workers and businesses, and environmentalists—all united
in defense of “our coast.” At times, this storyline was
deployed as an ironic foil for Gateway supporters’ own
“foreign elites” narrative. Consider, for example, a 2011
press release from Dogwood critiquing commentary by
Vancouver blogger Vivian Krause, whose research on
US foundations funding BC-based anti-Gateway groups
later inspired the federal government’s “foreign funded
radicals” storyline:
In the face of mounting pressure from the largest pipeline
company in Canada, an undisclosed consortium of international
oil companies funding Enbridge’s Northern Gateway project, and
a pro-oil sands, pro-Northern Gateway federal government. . . ,
we have helped build a broad grassroots movement of working
families, First Nations governments, businesses, chambers of
commerce, municipal governments, tourism operators and
fishermen willing to take action to prevent oil tankers from
threatening our coast. . . . .
None of the conspiracy theorists acknowledge that the fight
to protect our coast from the threat of a catastrophic oil spill is
a quintessential David vs. Goliath struggle—foreign-funded oil
interests like Enbridge are outspending environmental groups
working on this issue at least one hundred to one (Horter, 2011,
August 16).
YDA deployed a similar storyline in response to the government’s
“foreign funded radicals” rhetoric in January 2012. In a press
release, Nadleh Whut’en Chief Larry Nooski contrasted the
alliance of extra-regional elites with the grassroots actions of
Indigenous communities and their environmentalist allies:
First Nations are. . . offended at the suggestion by the Prime
Minister, Minister Oliver, and petro-lobbyists that foreign money
is interfering in the process, Chief Nooski added, saying: “First
Nations people are so opposed to this pipeline that we’re pulling
money out of our own pockets and community members are
doing everything that we can so that our voices are heard. We
are also proud of the wide-ranging support we’ve received from
our neighbours across the north, and from environmental groups”
(YDA, 2012, January 11).
Coastal First Nations articulated a similar internal frontier,
contrasting the illegitimacy of the expensive public relations
campaigns of wealthy Albertan corporations and Toronto-
based ad firms with their movements’ own regional
democratic legitimacy:
Enbridge’s multi-million dollar ad campaign is an act of
desperation to try to sell a project that clearly doesn’t have the
support of First Nations or British Columbians, says Coastal First
Nations executive director Art Sterritt. . .
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Sterritt says that’s why his organization has been reaching
out to British Columbians across BC where they work and live.
“It’s unfortunate that Enbridge has chosen to hire a high-priced
Toronto ad firm to try to tell us what we should think instead of
doing the hard work of dealing with people on their doorsteps”
(CFN, 2012, May 30).
At times this foreign invasion storyline was articulated with
references to Indigenous peoples’ experiences at the hands
of Canadian colonialism and the exploitation of Indigenous
territory by resource capital. One September 2012 CFN blog post
issued by the Heiltsuk Nation strongly condemned Enbridge’s
behavior throughout the JRP hearings:
The history of the Heiltsuk is filled with broken promises
from various companies that have come into our territory
and reaped the benefits of exploiting resources on which
we have always relied upon. . . [leaving] our territory and
our community with deep economic and environmental scars.
There is little doubt that Enbridge would also fall into that
category. Enbridge has clearly shown that it isn’t a good
corporate citizen – it’s dishonest. . . , incompetent. . . , and a bully
(characterizing opponents as revolutionaries, radicals) (CFN,
2012, September 20).
Regional Identities and Democratic
Agency: Dismissing an Industry Captured
Process
Opponent storylines explicitly linked demands concerning
unacceptable risks to local ecosystems, industries and
communities with related demands concerning regional
democracy, regulatory capture by industry, and Indigenous
sovereignty. Again, regional spatial frames provided a
discursive affinity which facilitated the equivalential linking
of these demands, as concerns about local places became
articulated with anger over the violation of regional
democratic authority and Indigenous sovereignty over
those same places. This strengthened the internal frontier
between the politically legitimate local actors forced to
absorb risk and the extra-regional elites imposing those
risks without consent.
Once opponents had established that frontier, they could
undermine the symbolic authority of what they claimed
was an industry-captured federal review, contrasting
the illegitimacy of the regulatory regime with their own
regional democratic legitimacy. This framing underpinned
assurances of their political agency: the anti-Gateway
coalition would win precisely because they were legitimate
representatives of regional democratic publics and
sovereign territories, while their enemies were illegitimate
extra-regional interlopers.
Both Indigenous organizations in the sample contrasted the
illegitimacy of an industry captured federal government with
the legitimacy of their own claims to territorial sovereignty
and regional solidarity with both Indigenous communities
and settler British Columbians. YDA—which had issued the
Save the Fraser Declaration, and whose members had refused
to take part in the JRP—issued a December 2011 press
release celebrating additional signatories to the declaration from
regional Indigenous communities:
First Nations, whose unceded territory encompasses the entire
coastline of British Columbia, have formed a united front,
banning all exports of tar sands crude oil through their
territories....These First Nations form an unbroken wall of
opposition from the U.S. border to the Arctic Ocean . . . . “The
government can talk all it wants about pushing tar sands oil
pipelines and tankers through BC. There is no way our Nations
will allow it,” says Chief Art Adolph representing the St’át’imc
Nation. “If they’re serious about respecting our rights, the
government of Canada must stop pushing the oil companies’ line
that this is in the public interest. . . (YDA, December 1, 2011).
The following year, a YDA press release had strong words
for the Harper government following Minister Oliver’s foreign
funded radicals remarks, linking concerns about community
safety, an industry captured regulatory system, and violations of
Indigenous sovereignty:
“The fix is in with this government. How can any Canadian trust
that the Enbridge review process will be conducted fairly and
independently with Harper breathing down the review panel’s
neck?” said Chief Larry Nooski of Nadleh Whut’en First Nation,
a member of the Yinka Dene Alliance. “It is ludicrous for the
federal minister to parrot tar sands lobbyists by directly attacking
our communities that have decided the Enbridge project is
too dangerous, and against our laws,” said Nooski. “We’re not
foreign—these are our lands.”
Chief Nooski went on to discuss the strength and political
efficacy of the alliance between regional First Nations and settler
British Columbians:
We have made a decision, in our Save the Fraser Declaration,
to ban these pipelines and tankers. Tens of thousands of British
Columbians have signed petitions specifically supporting our
decision. The Enbridge project has unified us andwe are not going
to stop until we win this together.
At other times, the JRP’s regional unaccountability was
unfavorably contrasted with the democratic ethos of grassroots
activism, as in a 2010 blog post by Dogwood’s Swanson (2010,
August 30) announcing an upcoming Vancouver rally:
Our current Federal Government supports Enbridge’s oil pipeline
and tanker project, and has given decision-making authority to
a review panel comprised of three non-British Columbians. This
rally will help send the message that the majority of people in this
province have made up our mind; and that our answer is no.
In framing the review process as an industry captured
sham, opponents were well-positioned to dismiss the symbolic
authority of the JRP when it did eventually approve Northern
Gateway in December 2013. A press release issued immediately
after the JRP’s announcement argued that its “recommendation
. . . [was] unsurprising given such a flawed process.” Sierra
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Club’s Caitlyn Vernon explicitly framed the JRP’s decision as an
attack on regional actors whose concerns about health, economic
well-being, and ecological sustainability were all undermined
by Gateway’s approval, arguing that it was “inconceivable how
the panel could sit through months of heartfelt, scientific and
economic testimony and fail to understand how the Enbridge
proposal would negatively impact jobs, families and the salmon
and clean drinking water we all depend on” (Sierra Club BC,
2013, December 19).
Opponents often contrasted the supposed illegitimacy of the
JRP ruling with the legal and moral authority of Indigenous title.
YDAmade this point forcefully in a press release that highlighted
the efficacy of the Indigenous-led movement while articulating a
common popular front with settler British Columbians similarly
dependent on the health of local ecosystems. The release quoted
“Chief Martin Louie of the Nadleh Whut’en First Nation,” who
stated that:
It’s no surprise that a flawed process has led to a flawed
recommendation. This project will never be built. The YinkaDene
Alliance has clearly refused permission for Enbridge’s pipelines to
cut through our lands and waters, and the federal and provincial
governments must accept that this project cannot go ahead. . .Our
position is clearly stated in the Save the Fraser Declaration, which
bans Enbridge’s Northern Gateway pipelines from our territories.
Nothing is changed by the JRP’s pronouncement. Enbridge is
not from this place, does not understand our laws and customs,
and will profit by damaging our environment now and into the
future. . . We have put ourselves in the frontline for all British
Columbians and together we are fighting for our homes, our
future and our children’s future (YDA, 2013, December 19).
Opponents often referred to regional public opinion polls as a
means to undermine the legitimacy of the JRP ruling. Not only
did a majority of those polled continue to oppose the project
following the ruling, but:
When asked whether they trust the review process, 51 per cent
of British Columbians say they distrust the process, while only
32 per cent trust it. . . “These polling results bring home why
the Enbridge tanker and pipeline proposal is going nowhere
fast—despite the JRP recommendation,” said Jessica Clogg of the
West Coast Environmental Law Association. “Residents of B.C.
continue to withhold [permission] for the project, while multiple
First Nations lawsuits threaten to derail it and the government
of B.C. [has] formally opposed the Enbridge project” (Dogwood
Initiative, 2014, February 5).
Opponents contrasted the democratic illegitimacy of the project’s
extra-regional elite backers with the results of local elections and
referendums. Following the April 2014 referendum in Kitimat, in
which 58% of voting residents in the proposed pipeline terminus
rejected the project 4 months after the JRP had approved it,
Dogwood’s Kai Nagata issued a blog post entitled “Let BC Vote.”
In it, Nagata advocated for the initiation of a province-wide direct
ballot initiative on the grounds that the Kitimat referendum had
proven that the anti-Gateway movement represented the will
of British Columbians. Nagata argued that the referendum was
a “battle between David and Goliath” in which “David [had]
won,” and celebrated the ability of local residents and grassroots
activists to defeat Enbridge, the powerful energy company from
outside the region:
For weeks, a small troop of local volunteers. . . were knocking
on doors and asking neighbors about their hopes and dreams
for Kitimat. The group had $200 in the bank—just enough for
some leaflets and handmade signs. Meanwhile, jets were flying
in Enbridge executives from Calgary. As the company’s paid
canvassers fanned out across town, a relentless barrage of slick
advertisements commanded residents to vote “YES” to a crude oil
export terminal on their doorstep... In the end, the people in B.C.
with the most to gain from Northern Gateway said “no thanks”. . .
(Nagata, 2014, April 12).
Unsurprisingly, when federal cabinet issued Gateway’s final
approval in June 2014, opponents were quick to dismiss
both the symbolic authority and practical efficacy of the
government’s decision. One Sierra Club BC (2014) press release
denounced Cabinet approval as affirmation that “the Federal
government is muchmore interested in representing the interests
of oil corporations than the interests of ordinary British
Columbians.” Nevertheless, the government’s announcement
“changes nothing”:
The federal government has set itself on a collision course with
the wall of opposition to the Enbridge pipeline and tankers
project. British Columbians from all walks of life—including
B.C.’s municipalities, First Nations, unions, businesses, and the
provincial government—who care deeply about the communities
and the province in which they live, have said no to Enbridge in
no uncertain terms . . . . (Sierra Club BC, 2014, June).
CONCLUSION
Today, the Northern Gateway project is dead. In the 2015 federal
election, the Conservatives were defeated by Justin Trudeau’s
Federal Liberals, whose party made significant electoral inroads
in BC (Hume et al., 2015, October 19). Trudeau had campaigned
to roll back the Harper government’s strident extractivist agenda,
promising to implement improved resource project reviews,
develop a meaningful federal response to climate change, and
pursue reconciliation with First Nations (Hume, 2016, January
13). A few months later, the Supreme Court sided with
Gateway’s Indigenous opponents, overturning the JRP ruling on
the grounds that affected communities had been insufficiently
consulted (Do, 2015, June 29). Shortly after, the new government
formally rejected Gateway, whose resurrection would have
required the initiation of another lengthy federal review process
to ensure that the government had fulfilled its constitutional
responsibility to consult and accommodate First Nations (Tasker,
2016, November 29). Though the rejection of Gateway by the
courts was likely the proximate cause of the Liberal government’s
ultimate “rejection” of the project, one should not underestimate
the underlying influence of the anti-Gateway coalition. After
all, initiating another project review would have undermined
Trudeau’s newly won electoral support in BC, while inviting the
negative press that would come with publicly battling a powerful,
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organized and highly motivated regional social movement, many
of whose members had just voted for him.
The ultimate demise of a project that had been strongly
supported by many of the most powerful elites in the country
indicates the importance of discourses related to ecological
interdependence with particular places in the political framing
of environmental politics. By articulating the Gateway project
with a regional spatial frame, opponents were able to rearticulate
popular understandings of the project’s distribution of risk and
benefit. From being the boon to the national interest described
by its supporters, Gateway was transformed into a sinister
conspiracy of extra-regional elites attacking the region and
overriding its democratic sovereignty.
In our study, analyzing the concrete communications
strategies of discourse coalitions emphasizes how activists
use collective action frames to generate populist storylines
designed to mobilize diverse movement constituents around
a shared objective. In particular, our findings demonstrate
how a focus on local places and spaces provided discursive
affinities between different actors’ demands. These affinities
allowed Gateway to emerge as an empty signifier through which
concerns about ecological sustainability, economic well-being,
Indigenous sovereignty, democratic accountability, and social
justice could be articulated into a common equivalential chain.
This contributed to the emergence of a diverse and robust
movement of First Nations, environmentalists, local settler
communities and regional governments. Following Laclau, these
actors came to construct a contingent popular identity based
upon their mutual confrontation with extra-regional elites
threatening their local economies, cultures, and communities.
As political theorists like Mouffe (2018) and public
intellectuals like (Frank, 2018) argue, there is both historical
precedence and theoretical justification for contemporary left
populisms to challenge the ongoing rise of Right Populism
not just in Canada but around the globe. Similarly, our study
indicates that populism is not rhetorical terrain which must
inevitably be ceded to the nationalist right when it comes to
environmental and energy politics. That Gateway opponents
were able to replicate yet reframe the same populist invasion
narrative developed by Gateway’s proponents gestures toward
the malleability of populist tropes, and the potential for
activists to articulate a counter-hegemonic populist politics.
However, building on this potential may require acknowledging
the limitations of Northern Gateway’s regional ecological
popular opposition.
First, one should not overstate the strength of the politically
contingent alliances made between the project’s First Nation and
settler opponents. On the one hand, shared recognition of mutual
interdependences with local places enabled heterogeneous
regional actors to unite in opposition to extra-regional elites.
This is not to imply that the place-based identities motivating
settler opponents were of a kind with the deep and long-
standing reciprocal relations between Indigenous peoples and
their traditional territories that scholars like Coulthard (2014)
describe. Yet there was clearly a discursive affinity between this
normativity and the connections to regional place motivating
settler opponents which enabled the emergence of a shared
populist storyline.
However, the connections to place motivating settler
opponents are, at least in part, rooted in the same settler colonial
political economy which contemporary decolonial politics seek
to transcend. As such, appeals to regional democratic sovereignty
and economic well-being motivating local settler communities
were often embedded in the very systems of property relations,
territorial expropriation, and settler colonial governance at the
heart of much contemporary discontent amongst Indigenous
peoples. If settler communities and environmentalists are to grow
their alliance with some Indigenous communities into a broader
counterhegemonic challenge to Canadian extractivism, they
will have to seriously consider how to constitute a meaningful
politics of Indigenous reconciliation that goes beyond short-term
alliances against specific projects.
Yet taking this path could complicate attempts to overcome
a second limitation of the anti-Gateway movement. While an
overwhelming focus on the regional and local enabled the
articulation of particular populist narratives, it foreclosed others.
Notably, said regional focus largely overshadowed broader
discussions of the oil sands’ contribution to climate change, the
broadly inequitable structure of Canada’s oil and gas industry,
and the need for the Canadian state to coordinate a rapid
post-carbon transition. While such concerns were certainly
discussed—at times with great force—overall they played second
fiddle to those oriented around regional well-being. This
approach helped motivate diverse regional actors to fight against
a particular local project that threatened local identities, ecologies
and economies. But it did not provide a compelling platform
for launching a broader conversation with Canadians outside of
British Columbia about the need for a rapid course reversal in
the country’s drive to dramatically increase fossil fuel production.
At some point, anti-extractivist activists will need to mobilize for
meaningful federal policy to transition off fossil fuels, whether
by phasing out oil sands production, funding renewable energy,
or making massive investments in public transportation and
green infrastructure. And it is difficult to see how any of this
would be politically achievable without engaging with—and
transforming—the Canadian state.
Contemporary political realities point in this direction. Today
national support for tar sands expansion remains high, and in
some ways the Liberals have emerged as industry’s new best
friend. As of writing, Trudeau has “approved several contentious
bitumen transport and export market diversification projects,
including the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain” Expansion
project in BC (Neubauer, 2019, p. 17). Recently his government
has even gone so far as to nationalize that project with $4.5
billion of public money, buying it from Kinder Morgan—a Texas
oil company—just as it was looking to abandon the project in
the face of continuing regional opposition in British Columbia
(Chase et al., 2018). Liberals have also welcomed the Trump
administration’s approval of the Keystone XL project meant to
connect Alberta bitumenwith refineries in the Gulf. If completed,
these projects will likely lead to major expansions in upstream
bitumen production, potentially undermining attempts to lower
national greenhouse gas emissions (Clarke et al., 2013). They have
also further strained relations with Indigenous communities,
some of which have opposed Kinder Morgan on grounds
similar to those which motivated the anti-Gateway opposition.
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In advocating for these projects, the Trudeau Liberals and other
industry defenders in the media and civil society have doubled
down on their claims that expanded oil and gas production is
an essential precursor to maintaining national prosperity and
serving the national interest. According to recent polls, a majority
of Canadians across the country believe these claims (Bricker,
2018). Meanwhile, national emissions continue to grow at an
alarming pace.
All this demonstrates the need for a serious Federal politics
that can challenge that of extractivism’s many supporters. In
some respects, this should be easy. By design, the contemporary
structure of Canada’s oil and gas industry disproportionately
benefits political and economic elites at the expense of ordinary
workers and taxpayers (Neubauer, 2019). Yet establishing a
national ecological popular politics will certainly complicate any
attempt by settler environmentalists to strengthen their nascent
alliance with Indigenous communities, as any simplistic attempt
to wave the flag or draw upon Canada’s colonial heritage runs the
risk of alienating the latter. This calls into question how and if any
emergent Canadian identity can be articulated with a meaningful
political vision of what a left-progressive, ecologically sustainable,
and socially just Canada reconciled with Indigenous peoples
could be. And that involves not just a new discursive storyline,
but a policy blueprint for a fundamentally transformed political
economy. That’s a high bar to reach. But it is one Canada’s anti-
extractivist movement may need to consider if it is to have any
hope of reversing the catastrophic course their country currently
finds itself on.
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